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Abstract 
Objective: Research using cognitive or perceptual tasks in autism spectrum disorder (ASD) often 
relies on mean RT and accuracy derived from alternative-forced choice paradigms. However, these 
measures can confound differences in task-related processing efficiency with caution (i.e. preference 
for speed or accuracy). We examined whether computational models of decision-making allow these 
components to be isolated. 
Method: Using data from two face-processing tasks (face recognition and egocentric eye-gaze 
discrimination), we explored whether adolescents with ASD and wide ranging intellectual ability 
differed from an age and IQ matched comparison group on model parameters that are thought to 
represent processing efficiency, caution, and perceptual encoding/motor output speed.  
Results:  We found evidence that autistic adolescents had lower processing efficiency and caution, 
but did not differ from non-autistic adolescents in the time devoted to perceptual encoding/motor 
output.  These results were more consistent across tasks when we only analysed participants with IQ 
above 85. Cross-task correlations suggested that processing efficiency and caution parameters were 
relatively stable across individuals and tasks. Furthermore, logistic classification with model 
parameters improved discrimination between individuals with and without ASD relative to 
classification using mean RT and accuracy. Finally, previous research has found that ADHD symptoms 
are associated with lower processing efficiency, and we observed a similar relationship in our 
sample, but only for autistic adolescents.   
Conclusions: Together, these results suggest that models of decision-making could provide both 
better discriminability between autistic and non-autistic individuals on cognitive tasks and also a 
more specific understanding of the underlying mechanisms driving these differences.  
Keywords 
Autism spectrum disorders, ADHD, decision-making, drift-diffusion model, face processing 
Public significance statement 
Researchers are often interested in how individuals with autism spectrum disorders (ASD) differ 
from those without on cognitive and perceptual tasks. We examined a different way to analyse 
results from these tasks, using computational models, and found that they better described 
differences between adolescents with and without ASD than standard measures.  One potential 
application of these findings is the development of more targeted training paradigms in the future. 
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Introduction 
Autism spectrum disorder (ASD) is characterised by social communication difficulties and the 
presence of restrictive and repetitive behaviours (American Psychiatric Association, 2013). In 
addition to these core symptoms, there has been enduring interest in the cognitive and perceptual 
phenotype in ASD and associated neurocognitive theories of ASD (e.g. Happe & Ronald, 2008; 
Pellicano & Burr, 2012 ). These theories tend to suggest that different cognitive processing styles can 
impact the development of social and communication deficits characteristic of ASD. The search for 
cognitive and perceptual differences in ASD has been comprehensive and spans a wide array of 
tasks. However, in many areas there is still no clear consensus on which tasks best differentiate 
autistic individuals from those without, and different studies often report conflicting findings (e.g. 
Charman et al., 2011; Kuiper, Verhoeven, & Geurts, 2016; Leekam, 2016; Simmons et al., 2009).  
 Most cognitive and perceptual tasks ask participants to make decisions – often in the form 
of alternative-forced-choice paradigms. Foƌ eǆaŵple, ͚Are the dots ŵoǀiŶg to the left oƌ the ƌight?͛ 
oƌ ͚Is this faĐe old oƌ Ŷeǁ?͛. The outcome measures are usually whether the participant made the 
correct choice (accuracy) and how long it took them to make it (response time, RT).  However, 
analysing RT and accuracy separately can confound differences in caution (i.e. speed/accuracy 
preference) with task-related ͚processing effiĐieŶĐǇ͛ ;i.e. diƌeĐtlǇ ƌelated to task proficiency).   An 
individual who is very cautious, or has a preference for accuracy over speed, will tend to make few 
errors but will have long RTs. While an individual who is very proficient at a task, and processes 
information efficiently, will tend to be both faster and more accurate. Thus, differences in RT and 
accuracy between groups with and without ASD could potentially arise due to differences in caution, 
task-related processing efficiency, or some mixture of the two. Computational models of decision 
making allow these two components to be disentangled (for reviews see Bogacz, Brown, Moehlis, 
Holmes, & Cohen, 2006; Forstmann, Ratcliff, & Wagenmakers, 2016; Ratcliff, Smith, Brown, & 
McKoon, 2016; Teodorescu & Usher, 2013), and may therefore be both more sensitive to task 
differences between individuals with and without ASD, and more diagnostic as to what these 
differences represent in terms of underlying mechanisms.  Using data from two face processing 
tasks, we investigated whether parameters derived from computational models of decision-making 
are better able to differentiate between individuals with and without ASD than traditional 
behavioural measures of accuracy and RT. We were also interested in whether any group differences 
in model parameters representing caution and processing efficiency are consistent across tasks or 
whether they are task-specific.  
Traditional behavioural measures versus models of decision making 
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 Reporting RT and accuracy separately can result in in scenarios where, hypothetically, a 
group of autistic individuals could respond more quickly on a task than those without ASD but are 
not as accurate.  What could a researcher conclude about the relative performance on this task? 
Such a result could occur because accuracy and response time confound efficiency of information 
processing (i.e. directly related to task proficiency) with caution (i.e. preference for speed or 
accuracy). Accumulator models such as the drift diffusion model (DDM, Ratcliff, 1978; Ratcliff & 
Rouder, 1998; Ratcliff et al., 2016) combine data from accuracy and RT, and allow these components 
to be isolated. In the example above, the DDM might reveal that autistic individuals are less cautious 
than individuals without, resulting in faster but less accurate responses, but task-related efficiency of 
information processing is similar between the groups. 
  The DDM assumes that when presented with a choice between two alternatives, 
information accumulates stochastically until one of two response boundaries is reached (Figure 1). 
The time it takes to reach a boundary corresponds to the RT and which boundary is reached 
corresponds to the choice (e.g. ĐoƌƌeĐt/iŶĐoƌƌeĐtͿ.  The ƌate of aĐĐuŵulatioŶ, oƌ ͚dƌift-ƌate͛, is 
thought to represent the quality of information extracted from the stimulus over time or the 
͚processing efficiency͛. Therefore, higher drift-rates result in faster and more accurate responses –
oǀeƌall ŵoƌe ͚pƌofiĐieŶt͛ peƌfoƌŵaŶĐe oŶ the task. Difficult tasks or conditions result in lower drift-
rates. Within tasks, individuals can differ in their drift rates, and indeed, this may be closely related 
to stable traits such as IQ (Ratcliff, Thapar, & McKoon, 2011; van Ravenzwaaij, Brown, & 
Wagenmakers, 2011).  Within the DDM, caution, or preference for speed/accuracy, is represented 
by the degree of boundary separation. Very cautious individuals will have widely separated 
boundaries and so require more information to accumulate before making a decision. This means 
that the decisions they make will tend to be more accurate but relatively slow. Whereas, less 
cautious individuals have boundaries closer together, resulting in faster responses that tend to be 
less accurate. The DDM also assumes that a component of the overall response time is devoted to 
perceptual encoding of the stimulus and motor output. This is represented by a parameter called 
͚ŶoŶ-deĐisioŶ tiŵe͛, which is added to the result of the accumulation process to yield the overall RT.  
 Besides a means to interpret RT and accuracy together, models like the DDM aim to fit the 
shape of the whole RT distribution and so may capture additional elements of the data that are 
missed by relying on only average RT. Recently, this has been successfully demonstrated in the 
literature on attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD), a condition characterised by 
impulsivity, inattention and hyperactivity (American Psychiatric Association, 2013).   Several papers 
have reported that individuals with ADHD show greater intra-participant variability in RT 
distributions (Castellanos et al., 2005; Johnson et al., 2007; Klein, Wendling, Huettner, Ruder, & 
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Peper, 2006; Kofler et al., 2013; Kuntsi, Oosterlaan, & Stevenson, 2001; Mullins, Bellgrove, Gill, & 
Robertson, 2005; Russell et al., 2006). In particular, individuals with ADHD have RT distributions with 
elongated tails, which when fitted with an ex-Gaussian function, is revealed in larger values of the 
eǆpoŶeŶtial ĐoŵpoŶeŶt ͚tau͛ ;EpsteiŶ et al., ϮϬϭϭ; Geuƌts et al., ϮϬϬϴ; KaƌaluŶas, HuaŶg‐PolloĐk, & 
Nigg, 2013; Kofler et al., 2013; Leth-Steensen, Elbaz, & Douglas, 2000).  Analysis of data with the 
DDM has revealed lower drift-rates in individuals with ADHD, which could explain this increase in 
intra-participant variability (Karalunas, Huang-Pollock, & Nigg, 2012; Karalunas et al., 2013; Metin et 
al., 2013; Salum et al., 2014). This suggests that individuals with ADHD may not process information 
as efficiently as neuro-typical controls.  Although one might predict that individuals with ADHD 
would be more impulsive (i.e. less cautious) than individuals without ADHD, analysis with the DDM 
found caution to be similar between groups. Distinguishing these processes is crucial for developing 
effective cognitive training therapies that target key areas of difficulty (Abikoff, 1991). The DDM has 
been used to successfully model, and reveal differences in, decision making processes in a number of 
other subpopulations, such as older adults (Ratcliff, Thapar, Gomez, & McKoon, 2004; Ratcliff, 
Thapar, & McKoon, 2004) aŶd iŶdiǀiduals ǁith PaƌkiŶsoŶ͛s disease (Zhang et al., 2016) and 
schizophrenia (Moustafa et al., 2015).  
Drift-diffusion model and ASD 
There is evidence that autistic individuals, like those with ADHD, show increased intra-participant 
variability and more elongated RT distributions than neuro-typical controls on a range of cognitive 
tasks (e.g. Geurts et al., 2008; for a meta-analysis see Karalunas, Geurts, Konrad, Bender, & Nigg, 
2014).  This could indicate a global impairment in processing efficiency that is not modality or task 
specific.  This might in turn explain the prevalence of conflicting findings in the cognitive and 
perceptual literature on ASD, because intra-participant variability could reduce test-retest reliability 
(Milne, 2011).  
On the assumption that intra-participant variability is explained in ADHD by lower drift-rates, 
we could predict that the elevated intra-participant variability in ASD would also be associated with 
lower drift-rates. Only two studies have used the DDM to explore differences in ASD.  The first found 
that autistic adults  did not differ in drift-rate from non-autistic adults when tested on an orientation 
discrimination task (Pirrone, Dickinson, Gomez, Stafford, & Milne, 2016).  Rather, this study 
suggested that autistic individuals have wider boundary separation (i.e. are more cautious) and 
longer non-decision times than non-autistic individuals.  The second study examined autistic children 
and also found wider boundary separations, this time using the go trials from the Stop Signal task 
(Karalunas et al., 2018). However, this study did find slower drift-rates in autistic participants.  Given 
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the large overlap between ASD and ADHD in both genotype and phenotype (e.g. Gargaro, Rinehart, 
Bradshaw, Tonge, & Sheppard, 2011; Keen & Ward, 2004; Leyfer et al., 2006; Mayes, Calhoun, 
Mayes, & Molitoris, 2012; Rommelse, Franke, Geurts, Hartman, & Buitelaar, 2010; Simonoff et al., 
2008), slower drift-rates in the ASD group could be attributable to the inclusion of individuals with 
increased ADHD traits or comorbidity (Karalunas et al., 2014). However, Karalunas et al; (2018) 
found that differences in drift-rate remained when ADHD symptoms were controlled for.  
 
Present study 
In the present study, our aim was to investigate whether autistic adolescents differed from those 
without ASD on DDM parameters of drift-rate (processing efficiency), boundary separation (caution) 
and non-decision time (perceptual encoding/motor output). We used the DDM to analyse data from 
wave two of the Special Needs and Autism Project (SNAP, Baird et al., 2006), which explored the 
cognitive phenotype of autistic adolescents (see Charman et al., 2011).  The participant sample in 
SNAP comprises individuals with ASD and a matched comparison group, and deliberately covers a 
broad range of intellectual ability (IQ range: 52-133).  Our main analysis contained the whole sample 
of participants, but we also repeated all analyses only on individuals with full-scale IQ scores above 
85. This was to ensure that any results we reported were not being driven by individuals with low IQ, 
additional neurodevelopmental conditions and special educational needs.  
Two tasks, face recognition and egocentric eye-gaze discrimination, were suitable for 
modelling with the DDM because they required participants to make alternative forced-choice 
decisions that were not presented using a staircase procedure. In order to maximise trial numbers 
for model fitting, and because our main area of interest was in global differences in behavioural 
measures and parameters, we collapsed across conditions within task.  Autistic individuals are 
known to show deficits in face recognition, which has been attributed to a tendency to focus on the 
mouth relative to the eyes and a reduction in holistic processing (Joseph & Tanaka, 2003; Langdell, 
1978). There is also evidence that autistic individuals show deficits in eye-gaze discrimination, 
although findings are somewhat mixed and may be depend on factors such as the direction of the 
head, the age and gender of participants, and whether the task involves spontaneous monitoring of 
gaze (Ashwin, Ricciardelli, & Baron-CoheŶ, ϮϬϬϵ; Foƌgeot d͛AƌĐ et al., ϮϬϭϳ; Leekaŵ, BaƌoŶ‐CoheŶ, 
Perrett, Milders, & Brown, 1997; Webster & Potter, 2008).  Autistic individuals might show deficits in 
face processing tasks because they find such stimuli more aversive than non-autistic individuals (e.g. 
Tottenham et al., 2013).   
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Taken together, autistic participants would be expected to perform less well on both face 
recognition and egocentric eye-gaze discrimination than the comparison participants without ASD. 
For the traditional behaviour measures, this could affect both accuracy and RT, although as 
discussed above, the exact pattern of results is conflated with paƌtiĐipaŶts͛ unique preference for 
speed or accuracy. In terms of model parameters, a deficit in task performance would be reflected in 
reduced drift-rate (efficiency of information processing). Since drift rate is explicitly separated from 
caution (boundary separation) by the model, it ought to be a purer measure of task processing 
deficit than RT or accuracy rates. Therefore, a key question for this study is whether drift rate differs 
between groups in either or both tasks. The corresponding question is whether boundary separation 
instead accounts for any behavioural differences between groups. Non-decision time is not expected 
to differ across groups, but could potentially do so due to low level perceptual differences.   
Drift-rate might also be reduced in the ASD group because of increased intra-participant 
variability, which is often captured in the DDM as a reduction in drift-rate. As discussed above, the 
relationship between intra-trial variability, drift-rate and ASD might be moderated by comorbid 
ADHD, and so we also explored the relationship between model parameters and ADHD symptoms 
using a parent-report questionnaire.   
If model parameters do represent stable character traits, we would predict that group 
differences in these parameters are stable across tasks and the parameters themselves would 
correlate across tasks.  
Lastly, we predicted that DDM parameters would be better able to distinguish autistic and 
non-autistic individuals than standard behavioural measures (mean RT/accuracy), because they are 
able to separate variance due to caution (i.e. speed-accuracy trade-off) from task or individual 
specific effects.  In order to investigate this, we trained a logistic classifier on each measure and 
compared discriminability performance (inspired by Zhang et al., 2016).  The purpose of this was not 
to identify a measure that is diagnostically relevant for ASD, but rather to test whether the DDM 
parameters offer better discriminability than traditional measures when searching for task or trait 
specific differences between groups. 
 
Methods 
Participants 
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The full sample of participants consisted of 75 autistic adolescents (mean age = 15.5 years, SD = 0.54, 
67 male) and 46 non-autistic adolescents (mean age = 15.5 years, SD = 1.3, 45 male).  The 
participants were drawn from a cohort of 100 autistic adolescents and 57 non-autistic adolescents 
who were part of wave two of the Special Needs and Autism project (Charman et al., 2011). 
Adolescents were excluded if data were not available on both tasks. We also excluded participants 
who scored below chance on either tasks or whose average RT exceeded 3 x median absolute 
deviation on either task.  Thirty-three of the participants excluded had ASD, 25 were male, the 
average full scale IQ was 71.7 (SD = 19.5), the average age was 15.4 years (SD = 0.4) and the average 
ADHD symptom score was 6.3 (SD = 2.3).  Consensus clinical ICD-10 diagnosis of ASD was confirmed 
using the Autism Diagnostic Interview - Revised (Lord, Rutter, & Le Couteur, 1994) and Autism 
Diagnostic Observation Schedule – Generic  (Lord et al., 2000), alongside measures of IQ, language 
and adaptive behaviour (see Baird et al., 2006).  
Participants in the comparison group comprised 18 children from wave one without ASD but 
with a range of primary ICD-10 diagnoses (8 with mild mental retardation, 3 moderate mental 
retardation, 2 ADHD, 2 specific reading and spelling disorder, 1 expressive/receptive language 
disorder, 1 no primary diagnosis), and 28 typically developing adolescents recruited from 
mainstream schools specifically for wave two. By parent report, none of the typically developing 
adolescents had a psychiatric or developmental diagnosis, a statement of special educational needs, 
or were receiving medication. Parents completed the Social Communication Questionnaire (Rutter, 
Bailey, & Lord, 2003) for 23 of the typically developing participants and none scored 15 or above, the 
cut-off for ASD (mean score = 3.39, SD = 3.63). IQ was measured using the Wechsler Abbreviated 
Scale of Intelligence (Wechsler, 1999). Bayesian independent t-tests using default priors suggested 
moderate evidence that there was no difference between the groups on age (BF01 = 5.0) or IQ (BF01 
= 3.9).   
All analyses were repeated for the subgroup of participants with full scale IQ scores above 
85, which consisted of 45 autistic adolescents and 30 non-autistic adolescents.  We selected a cut-off 
of 85 because it is one standard deviation below mean IQ, and it excluded all of the comparison 
group participants who had ICD-10 diagnoses relevant to the task, while critically allowing the 
groups to remain largely IQ matched. Two individuals in the comparison group had an ICD-10 
diagnosis of Specific Reading Impairment, but the tasks did not involve reading.  Results with these 
two participants removed are shown in Supplementary Materials (Figure 3-5). The same exclusion 
criteria detailed above were also applied to this subgroup.  Bayesian independent t-tests suggested 
moderate evidence in favour of no age difference between the groups (BF01 = 4.1), and no evidence 
either way for a difference in full Scale IQ between the groups (BF01 = 0.47).    See Table 1 for 
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participant demographics and psychological measurements. Approval for the study was granted by 
the South East Research Ethics Committee (05/MRE01/67) and informed consent was obtained from 
all participants 
 
Tasks 
Most participants were tested in a quiet testing space withiŶ the ƌeseaƌĐheƌ͛s iŶstitutioŶ, but a 
minority were tested at school or home in a 1:1 quiet environment.  The tasks were part of a larger 
battery of 58 tasks that were administered over two separate testing sessions, lasting 3 to 3.5 hours 
each excluding breaks. The tasks most appropriate for modelling with the DDM were a face identity 
recognition task and an egocentric eye-gaze discrimination task.  Both tasks were programmed in 
Matlab v6.5 (Mathworks Inc., Sherbon, MA) using Cogent 2000 (Wellcome Department of Imaging 
Neuroscience, UCL Institute of Neurology, London, UK; http://www.vislab.ucl.ac.uk/cogent.php) and 
presented on a Hewlett-PaĐkaƌd laptop ǁith a ϭ5͟ LCD displaǇ sĐƌeeŶ. In order to maximise the 
number of trials for fitting, we collapsed RT and accuracy data across conditions.  This was justified 
because our main area of interest was whether the DDM parameters added anything to general 
differences in RT and accuracy that might be consistent across tasks, rather than condition-specific 
differences between groups.  
Face recognition 
This task was based on Joseph and Tanaka͛s (2003) assessment of holistic and part based face 
recognition in autistic children.  In the task, recognition of faces and parts of faces (mouth or eyes) 
was measured. Additionally, whether participants were prompted or unprompted to look at the 
mouth or eyes during the study (encoding) phase was manipulated.  
Testing began with a practice phase where participants were told they would be playing a game in 
which they would see a picture in the middle of the screen.  After presentation of the picture they 
ǁeƌe theŶ pƌeseŶted ǁith the iŶitial piĐtuƌe aloŶgside a foil. TheǇ ǁeƌe told to, ͚Choose the oŶe that 
is the saŵe͛.  The fiƌst tƌial used photographs of cars and the second used photographs of faces. 
Images were presented in PowerPoint. Participants needed to pass both trials to progress to the 
testing phase. 
Faces used in the testing phase were created by Joseph and Tanaka (2003). They were greyscale 
digital images of ϭϮ ĐhildƌeŶ͛s faĐes (6 boys, 6 girls) with a neutral expression. Their size was 
approximately 10 x 14 cm and they were set against a grey background. Each image was a digitally 
manipulated composite created from original digital photographs of different children (see Joseph 
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and Tanaka for details). Within each condition (prompted or unprompted) each target face was 
pƌeseŶted tǁiĐe. OŶe ǁas a ͚ǁhole͛ pƌeseŶtatioŶ iŶ ǁhiĐh the ǁhole taƌget faĐe ǁas folloǁed ďǇ 
paired presentation of the whole target face and a whole foil faĐe. The otheƌ ǁas a ͚paƌt͛ 
presentation, in which the whole target face was followed by paired presentation of part of the 
target face and part of a foil face. The part was either the eyes or mouth. Foils were the target faces 
with either the eyes or mouth replaced with those from unused photographs. In total there were 48 
pairs of images (12 targets x 2 foil types (mouth or eyes altered) x 2 image types (whole face or part 
face), which were divided into two sets of 24 (prompted and unprompted conditions). Stimuli 
presentation was in one of six pseudo-random orders.  
In the first part of the trial, the target image was presented in the centre of the screen for 3.5s 
(study phase). Immediately following this, the target and foil pair were presented. Participants were 
asked to decide which image was the same as the one they had just seen, using a keypress.  
Whether the target face was presented on the left or right was counterbalanced across trials.  After 
the participant had made a response, or following 7 s if they failed to respond, the next trial was 
initiated. For the unprompted trials, the inter-trial interval was 1s, and consisted of the presentation 
of a white rectangle (500 ms) followed by a blank screen (500 ms). For the prompted trials, the inter-
tƌial iŶteƌǀal ǁas also ϭs ďut ĐoŶtaiŶed the iŶstƌuĐtioŶ to ͚look at the eǇes͛ oƌ ͚look at the ŵouth͛, 
presented in white font (Arial, 70) on a black background. Before the prompted condition the 
participants were told, ͞You ǁill eitheƌ ďe told to look at the eǇes oƌ look at the ŵouth; this is a Đlue 
to help Ǉou͟.  The order of the trials was pseudo-randomised, with 6 different orders used. Viewing 
distance for the task was approximately 75 cm, in line with Joseph and Tanaka (2003). Accuracy and 
RT were recorded for each trial. 
Egocentric eye-gaze discrimination 
This task was based on Elgar, Campbell and Skuse (2002)  and measured discrimination of eye-gaze 
direction (straight ahead vs averted) for different head angles (straight ahead vs averted).  
Participants first completed three practice trials to ensure that the task was understood. The first 
trial had a face that looked straight ahead and the second and third had faces that were angled to 
the left or right. Participants had to complete all three trials successfully to take part in the 
experiment. Practice trials were presented in PowerPoint.  
Stimuli used in this experiment were provided by Elgar et al. (2002) and were colour photographs of 
a single adult female, sized approximately 10 cm x 15 cm. The female was captured with her head 
facing straight ahead (12 trials), or turned at a 10° angle to the left (12 trials) or right (12 trials). For 
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each of these head positions, for 4 trials the eye gaze was straight ahead, for 4 trials the eye gaze 
was to the right, and for 4 trials the eye gaze was to the left.  The position of the left and right eye 
gaze was at a 10° angle from the centre (head angled conditions) or at a 5° or 10° angle from the 
centre (head straight ahead condition).  Trials were presented in one of six pseudo random orders. 
For each trial, the stimulus was presented in the centre of the screen for up to 7 s. If the participant 
did not respond within 7 s then the trial was terminated. A black background was used throughout 
the experiment. Each trial was preceded by a white fixation asterisk (1s) followed by a blank screen 
(500 ms). The participants were told that they had to decide if the person was looking straight at 
them, or to their left or right and indicate this with a key press. Participants were also instructed to 
respond as quickly and as accurately as they could. Participants sat approximately 50 cm from the 
screen, following Elgar et al., (2002). Accuracy and RT were recorded for each trial.  
 
Parent-reported ADHD symptoms 
ADHD symptoms were measured using the parent version of the Strengths and Difficulties 
Questionnaire (SDQ, Goodman, 1997). The SDQ is a commonly used screening measure for child 
psychiatric problems. It contains 25 items each scored 0 to 2 that map onto five subscales 
(hyperactivity-inattention, emotional problems, conduct problems, peer relationship problems and 
prosocial behaviour) and a total difficulties score.  For the present study we only used scores from 
the hyperactivity-inattention subscale.  This subscale includes two items about inattention, two 
about hyperactivity and one about impulsiveness, which together reflect the core symptoms of 
ADHD (American Psychiatric Association, 2013).   
 
Hierarchical drift-diffusion model  
Parameters were estimated using the hierarchical drift diffusion model toolbox (HDDM, Wiecki, 
Sofer, & Frank, 2013) and RT and accuracy data from both tasks. The HDDM uses Bayesian inference 
procedures to simultaneously estimate parameters at a group level (ASD vs non ASD) and at an 
individual level.  Bayesian fitting methods are particularly advantageous in situations where there 
are relatively few trials per participant (Ratcliff & Childers, 2015), as was the case in the present 
study. This is because trials across participants contribute to the estimate of group-level parameters, 
which in turn constrain the distribution (likely values) of individuals' parameters.   
The HDDM uses the standard analytic solution to the DDM provided by Wald (1947) and Feller 
(1968): 
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Where v = drift-rate, a = boundary, z = bias. It also models the extension to the DDM that includes 
inter-trial variability in drift-rate, non-decision time and starting point, which was suggested by 
Ratcliff and Rouder (1998). Extended details about the fitting process and assumed parameter 
distƌiďutioŶs ĐaŶ ďe fouŶd iŶ WieĐki et al. ;ϮϬϭϯͿ, iŶ the seĐtioŶ titled ͚HieƌaƌĐhiĐal BaǇesiaŶ 
estimation of the drift-diffusioŶ ŵodel͛.  
A graphical representation of the model is shown in figure 2. We allowed drift-rate boundary 
separation and non-decision time to vary across individual and group.  Starting point bias, and 
variability in non-decision time, drift-rate and bias were fitted to the overall dataset and were 
therefore consistent across group and individual. Attempts to vary these resulted in poor 
convergence due to the relatively small number of trials.   
We generated 20000 samples from the posterior distribution for all model parameters using 
a Markov Chain Monte-Carlo method. To prevent the initial starting values from biasing the final 
convergence, we discarded the first 2000 samples as burn-in. We only kept every fifth sample in 
order to minimise auto-correlations between consecutive draws from the posterior distribution 
;͚thiŶŶiŶg͛Ϳ.  We also assumed a trial outlier rate of 5%.  See Wiecki et al., (2013) for more 
information.  Chain convergence was checked using the Gelman-Rubin R-hat statistic (Gelman & 
Rubin, 1992), which was less than 1.05 for all modals suggesting good convergence.  
Group classification  
We trained a logistic classifier to distinguish between the ASD and non-ASD groups using either 
model parameters (drift-rate and boundary) or traditional measures (RT and accuracy). We excluded 
non-decision time because we did not find evidence of a group difference and it allowed the 
classification space to contain the same number of features for both behavioural measures and 
model parameters.  A 10 fold cross validation procedure was used.  Data were split into 10 
subsamples, 9 of which were initially used for training and one for validation.  This routine was then 
repeated until all the 10 sub-samples had been used for validation. Results were then averaged 
across the 10 folds. Our performance measure for classification was the receiver operating 
characteristics (ROC) area under the curve (AUC).  The classifier was implemented in WEKA 
(http://www.cs.waikato.ac.nz/ml/weka/). It is worth noting that leave-one-out cross validation 
procedures can yield higher predication accuracy values than methods using independent test and 
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validation samples, however, our principal concern here was the comparison in discrimination ability 
between behavioural measures and model parameters.  
 
Results 
Results analysis 
Behavioural results were analysed using Bayesian Statistics (JASP-Team, 2016; Rouder, Morey, 
Speckman, & Province, 2012) and we report associated Bayes Factors which represent the degree to 
which the data favour the alternative hypothesis (H1) relative to the null hypotheses (H0). Where 
BF10 indicates evidence towards H1 against H0 and BF01 indicates evidence towards H0 against H1. 
We use common evaluation criteria, where Bayes Factors below 3 indicate inconclusive evidence, 
above 3 indicate moderate evidence, above 10 indicate strong evidence, and above 30 indicate very 
strong evidence (Jeffreys, 1961).  Default JASP priors were used throughout and are shown in Table 
2.  Modal parameters were compared across groups using posterior probability comparisons, which 
calculate the proportion of posteriors of each parameter that overlap across the two groups. Values 
here are reported as the proportion of posteriors of the comparison group that are smaller than that 
of the ASD group.  Smaller values therefore indicate more of a difference between the groups.  
 
Behavioural results 
Figure 3 shows average accuracy (A) and reaction time (B) for ASD and non-ASD groups for both the 
face recognition and egocentric eye-gaze discrimination tasks.  Two Bayes Factor ANOVAs were 
performed separately on accuracy and RT data. Both analyses revealed inconclusive evidence of 
differences between the groups on either task (main effect of group BFs all <3 and > 0.3, supporting 
neither null or alternative hypothesis) and evidence of no interaction between task and group (BF01 
all >3). When repeating these analyses for participants with IQs above 85, we found evidence that 
the non-ASD groups was more accurate than the ASD group (BF10 = 84), but evidence in favour of no 
difference between the group in RT (BF01 = 4.5). Average accuracy and reaction times are shown in 
Figure 4 (A-B).   Descriptive results are shown in Supplementary Tables 1 and 2.  
DDM parameters 
Posterior parameter estimates of drift-rate (processing efficiency), boundary separation (caution) 
and non-decision time (perceptual encoding/motor output) are shown in Figure 3C-E (whole sample) 
and Figure 4C-E (IQ above 85).  Posterior probability comparisons indicated that, for the face 
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recognition task, the ASD group showed smaller boundary separation than the comparison group ( 
P( comparison a < ASD a) = 0.003). There was less evidence supporting a difference in drift-rate or 
non-decision time ( P( comparison v <  ASD v) = 0.3, P(comparison t < ASD t = 0.15) ).  For 
participants with IQ above 85, the ASD group again showed smaller boundary separation than the 
comparison group ( P ( comparison a < ASD a = 0.001). However, we now additionally found 
evidence of lower drift-rates in the ASD group (P (comparison v < ASD v = 0.021). Non-decision time 
remained comparable between groups (P( comparison t < ASD t = 0.53). 
 For the eye-gaze task, we found some evidence that the ASD group have lower drift-rate 
than the comparison group (P (comparison v < ASD v = 0.05) but no obvious difference in boundary 
or non-decision time ( P (comparison a < ASD a = 0.18), P(comparison t < ASD t = 0.83).  For 
participants with IQ above 85, the difference in drift-rate between the groups remained (P 
(comparison v < ASD v = 0.002) and there was still little difference in non-decision time ( P 
(comparison t < ASD t = 0.1). However, we now found some evidence that, like the face processing 
task, participants with ASD had smaller boundary separation (P (comparison a < ASD a = 0.05) ).  
 Taken together, these results suggest that for participants with IQ above 85, adolescents in 
the ASD group process information less efficiently and are less cautious than non-autistic 
adolescents, but show similar non-decision times.  When the whole sample of participants across IQ 
is analysed, differences in information processing and caution are less consistent and potentially 
more task specific.   
 
Model fits 
To ensure that the estimated model parameters were a good representation of the data, we 
performed posterior predictive checks by simulating 500 experimental data sets for each participant 
on each task based on their individual parameter estimates. Figure 5 and 6 shows comparisons 
between observed data and simulated data RT distributions and Table 3 and 4 shows mean square 
errors (MSEs).  Overall, there is a fairly good correspondence for RTs for both correct and incorrect 
trials, suggesting that the estimated parameters captured the data well.   
  
Group classification 
Our next question was whether DDM parameters are better able to differentiate between 
individuals with and without ASD than traditional measures of RT and accuracy. To investigate, we 
trained a logistic classifier to distinguish between the groups using a 10-fold cross validation 
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procedure (see Methods). We first used the mean RT and accuracy data from both tasks as the 
feature space for classification.  This model was able to classify the groups with an AUC value of 
0.63.  The associated ROC curve is shown in Figure 3F, grey line.  We then used the estimated model 
parameters (drift-rate and boundary separation) across both tasks as the classification feature space. 
This produced an AUC value of 0.72 (Fig. 3F, black line). Following the method described in Hanley 
and McNeil (1983), the difference between the AUC values was statistically significant (Z = 2.96, p < 
0.01). The classification procedure was repeated on participants with IQs above 85 and 
discrimination ability for the model parameters increased to an AUC of 0.89.  Classification using 
traditional measures also increased in this subset of participants, but to a lesser extent (AUC = 0.71). 
ROC curves are shown in Figure 4F.  The difference between these AUC values was also statistically 
significant (Z = 2.36, p < 0.05). Therefore, the DDM parameters were better able to differentiate 
between the groups than the traditional behavioural measures for these tasks.  
Relationship between drift-rate and hyperactivity-inattention 
Previous research has suggested that individuals with ADHD process information less efficiently, i.e. 
have lower drift-rates, than individuals without ADHD.  We were therefore interested in whether 
individual differences in drift-rates were related to ADHD symptoms in our sample, which were 
measured using the hyperactivity-inattention subscale from the SDQ.   Figure 6 shows scatterplots of 
these relationships, split by group and task.  A moderation analysis was carried out separately for 
each task, with drift-rate as the IV, group as the moderator and ADHD symptoms as the DV. For the 
face recognition task, we found evidence that drift-rate negatively predicted ADHD symptoms (BF10 
for inclusion of main effects model = 9.4). However, we also found evidence that this relationship 
was moderated by group (BF10 for inclusion of interaction model = 9.3), whereby drift-rate only 
predicted ADHD symptoms in the non-ASD group, not the ASD group. This pattern of results was 
replicated for the egocentric eye-gaze task (BF10 main effect of drift-rate = 4.6, BF10 for interaction 
= 17.8).  However, when IQ was also included in the regression, the data was inconclusive for a main 
effect of drift-rate or a group x drift-rate interaction on either task (face recognition, main effect of 
drift-rate BF10 = 0.60, interaction BF10 = 1.3; egocentric eye-gaze, main effect of drift-rate BF10 = 
0.45, interaction BF10 = 1.5). This pattern of results was replicated for both verbal and performance 
IQ, when these were analysed separately.   
These results suggest that ADHD symptoms were not related to drift-rate (processing 
efficiency) in autistic participants. In contrast, in non-autistic participants, drift-rate was negatively 
associated with ADHD symptoms, but this relationship was strongly influenced by differences in IQ. 
This is consistent with previous research where drift-rate is often closely related to IQ scores (Ratcliff 
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et al., 2011; van Ravenzwaaij et al., 2011) and indeed a moderation analysis revealed this 
relationship was present in our study, although only for non-autistic adolescents ( face recognition 
task, group x drift-rate interaction model BF10 = 29, egocentric eye-gaze task group x drift-rate 
interaction model BF10 = 31).  
In participants with an IQ above 85, we either found no, or inconclusive evidence, that drift-
rate predicted ADHD symptoms on either task (main effect model BF10 for inclusion, face 
recognition = 0.70, egocentric eye-gaze = 0.25), and no, or inconclusive, evidence for a moderation 
by group either (interaction model BF10 for inclusion = 1.26, egocentric eye-gaze = 0.42).  However, 
because most of these Bayes factors fall in the range where there is no evidence to support the null 
or the alternative hypothesis, we cannot know the extent to which the reduced sample size in this 
cohort contributed to the results.   
Cross-task correlations 
We were also interested in the extent to which the DDM parameters represent stable traits that are 
consistent across tasks. To explore this, we compared individual differences in parameters across 
tasks using Bayesian Pearson correlations (Figure 7).  We set a beta prior width of 1 and assumed no 
hypothesis for the correlation direction. Data from the ASD and non-ASD groups were pooled 
because Fisher r to z transformations suggested no evidence of a difference between the groups on 
these correlations.   There was a clear positive correlation between drift-rates for the two tasks (R = 
0.5, BF10 = 106). Likewise, we found strong evidence for a positive correlation between boundary 
separation on the two tasks (R = 0.32, BF10 = 55).  We found inconclusive evidence that non-decision 
time correlated across tasks (R = 0.14, BF10 = 0.36).  This pattern of correlations remained when only 
data from participants with IQs above 85 were analysed (drift-rate, R=0.39, BF10 = 92; boundary 
separation, R = 0.29, BF10 = 4.8; NDT, R= 0.22, BF10 = 0.93).  To summarise, individual differences in 
drift-rate (processing efficiency) and boundary separation (caution) were correlated across tasks, 
while non-decision times (perceptual encoding/motor output) were either more task specific or 
noisier.  
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Discussion  
Accumulator models, such as the drift-diffusion model, are gaining popularity in clinical research due 
to their potential to isolate mechanisms underlying the decision-making process. Our interest here 
was whether autistic individuals display global and stable differences in DDM parameters such as 
drift-rate (processing efficiency), boundary separation (caution) and non-decision time (perceptual 
encoding, motor output).  Using data from two face processing tasks, we measured differences in 
model parameters between autistic and non-autistic adolescents across a wide range of IQ and in a 
sub-group with IQ above 85.  In the group with IQ above 85, we found that autistic participants 
exhibited lower drift-rates and narrower boundary separation than IQ-matched non-autistic 
adolescents, on both tasks. This suggests that autistic individuals did not process information as 
efficiently, and were less cautious, than non-autistic individuals. We did not find any group 
differences in the time associated with perceptual encoding and motor output (non-decision time).  
When participants with low IQ were also included in the analysis, the results were not as consistent 
across tasks, and we found evidence of boundary difference in one task and drift-rates differences in 
the other. There were still no differences in non-decision time.  
Crucially, if we had only analysed the means of RT and accuracy our interpretation of the results 
would have been quite different. For participants with an IQ above 85, we found differences in 
accuracy but not in RT, which could be interpreted as similar processing speed between the groups 
but that the autistic participants made more errors. The DDM provided a different interpretation – 
that processing speed did differ between the groups, but so did caution, which could have masked 
task-related differences in raw RT. Furthermore, using a classification procedure we found that DDM 
parameters were better able to differentiate between the groups on the two face-processing tasks 
than standard behavioural measures.  The aim of the classification was not to provide a diagnostic 
measure of ASD, but merely to demonstrate that model parameters may offer greater 
discriminability relative to traditional behaviour measures, at least in the two tasks examined in this 
study.   
Limitations 
Before discussing the results further, it is important to note that the data were not collected with 
modelling in mind and therefore we were limited in our possible analyses. In particular, we had to 
pool trials across conditions so that the parameter recovery would be reliable. This was the main 
study limitation, which we discuss in detail below. This is likely to be a frequent problem for post-hoc 
data modelling in any domain, as it is rare to collect an ideal number of trials for modelling, 
18 
 
especially in clinical populations. As modelling grows in accessibility, we hope it might become more 
common to plan trial numbers with modelling in mind.    
Drift-rate: a measure of neural variability or task related performance?  
One of our main motivations for this study was the previous successful application of DDM to ADHD 
research. Recent studies have shown that increased intra-participant variability in ADHD can be 
explained by a reduction in drift-rate (Karalunas et al., 2012; Karalunas et al., 2013; Metin et al., 
2013; Salum et al., 2014).  Given reports than autistic individuals may also show increased intra-
participant variability (Geurts et al., 2008; Karalunas et al., 2014) and a recent study that found lower 
drift-rates in autistic children (Karalunas et al., 2018), we anticipated that drift-rates may also be 
reduced in our autistic participants. In line with this prediction, drift-rates were reduced for both 
tasks in our ASD group with IQ above 85, which was most comparable to the participant sample used 
in previous studies.  However, we also found that autistic participants had narrower boundary 
separation than the non-autistic group. This is contrary to the only other two studies that have 
applied the DDM to ASD data, where wider boundary separation was found in the ASD group 
(Karalunas et al., 2018; Pirrone et al., 2016).  It should be noted that both of these studies used a 
different autistic population (intellectually able adults and children) to ours (adolescents with a wide 
range of intellectual ability).  
 It is notable that Pirrone et al. used a low level perceptual discrimination task (orientation 
discrimination), which has previously been found to be enhanced in ASD (Dickinson, Bruyns-Haylett, 
Smith, Jones, & Milne, 2016).  In contrast, we used two socially-relevant tasks that centred on faces, 
and reflect substantial literatures finding impairment in both face recognition (Weigelt, Koldewyn, & 
Kanwisher, 2012) and processing eye gaze (Nation & Penny, 2008).  The reduction in drift-rate 
(information processing efficiency) that we observed in our autistic participants could be specific to 
face processing. Further, autistic participants may have been less cautious in responding in these 
particular tasks because they found the face stimuli more aversive (e.g. Tottenham et al., 2013).  
Indeed, this might explain why our results for boundary separation were different from those of 
Pirrone et al and Karalunas et al., both of whom used non-social stimuli. One of our main areas of 
interest is whether DDM parameters measured for a particular task or group would generalise to 
other tasks and other sub-populations of that group. Unfortunately, we did not have access to a 
non-face processing task that was also suitable for DDM fitting to act as a control. However, the 
disparities between the Pirrone et al. (2016) and Karalunas et al. (2018) studies and ours could 
suggest that parameters depend on task domain. Future research should explore this further with a 
wider variety of tasks.  It is worth nothing, however, that for the two face-processing tasks we 
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analysed, the boundary separation and drift-rate parameters were reasonably well correlated across 
individuals.  It is also the case that even if the results do not generalise to non-socially related tasks, 
the DDM findings still challenged the traditional interpretation that any differences in RT/Accuracy 
are solely due to task related processing.   
Increased intra-participant variability in ADHD has been found in a number of tasks and so 
may represent a global deficit in information processing that is related to lapses in attention 
(Karalunas et al., 2014). Differences in drift-rates in ASD have currently been explored on fewer 
tasks, although it is likely that increased variability in the RT distribution, in absence of increased 
accuracy, will often translate to lower drift-rate under the DDM.  It has previously been suggested 
that increased intra-participant variability in ASD may be driven by a sub-set of autistic participants 
who have elevated ADHD traits (Karalunas et al., 2014).  However, in our autistic sample drift-rate 
did not correlate with a parent reported measure of hyperactivity, inattention and impulsivity, 
suggesting that the differences we observed between the ASD and non ASD groups were not being 
driven by co-occurring ADHD traits. This finding is also supported by previous work by Karalunas et al 
(2018) who also found that differences in drift-rate in autistic participants were not explained by 
ADHD symptoms.  
Processing efficiency, which is reflected in differences in drift-rate, can be due to a number 
of factors.  For individuals with ADHD, it is generally thought to represent a global difficulty in 
information processing, in particular an increase in attentional lapses (Karalunas et al., 2014). At a 
neural level, this could correspond to increases in neural noise and differences in oscillatory brain 
rhythms (Castellanos et al., 2005; Di Martino et al., 2008; Tamm et al., 2012). However, in our study 
we used measures of face processing, an area often associated with difficulties in autistic 
populations. Thus, decreased drift-rates might be more likely to correspond to difficulties in task-
specific processing rather than global attentional problems.  This may also explain why for non-
autistic adolescents, IQ was strongly related to task performance (drift-rate), but this relationship 
was not present for autistic adolescents where task performance may have been influenced by 
factors beyond general intellectual ability.   As noted earlier, future research exploring a wider range 
of tasks will help to disentangle these two hypotheses.  It is worth considering for future research 
that a decrease in drift-rate can either be due to deficits in task performance or due to a global 
processing defects related to increased variability, which could potentially be seen as a limitation of 
the modelling approach. Of course, this limitation would also apply to traditional behavioural 
measures, because increased variability in RT distributions tend to result in average RTs that are 
longer.  
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Estimation of ADHD symptoms 
An important limitation of our study is that the ADHD symptom measure we used from the SDQ did 
not allow us to explore the separate effects of inattention and hyperactivity, the former of which is 
most commonly associated with cognitive performance deficits (Castellanos, Sonuga-Barke, Milham, 
& Tannock, 2006).  However, the SDQ is well validated and the items that load on the ADHD factor 
(inattention, hyperactivity, impulsivity) show good internal consistency across individuals (Goodman, 
2001).  Future research is needed to examine whether individual differences in hyperactivity, 
impulsivity and inattention show different interactions with DDM parameters in autistic individuals. 
It might be predicted that inattention is more strongly related to drift-rate, while impulsivity is 
related to caution. Unfortunately, such a fine-grained analysis was beyond the scope of the current 
study.  
Effects of IQ variability and participant heterogeneity 
Our study had a number of advantages, including a reasonably large sample size and a wide range of 
intellectual ability.  The majority of research looking at cognitive performance in ASD tends to focus 
on individuals with average to high IQ, which is not representative of the autistic population as a 
whole (Brugha et al., 2018). In our study we had wide range of ability in the ASD group and an IQ-
matched comparison group. However, many of the individuals with lower IQ had additional clinical 
diagnoses, as can often be the case with individuals with low IQ. Therefore, in order to ensure that 
our results were not being driven by individuals with additional educational needs or clinical 
diagnoses, we repeated all of the analyses for a restricted range of participants with IQ above 85.  
Mostly, the results remained consistent with those collected from the whole cohort, 
although differences in drift-rate and boundary were more evident in the group with IQ above 85, 
and we also found differences in raw accuracy. This suggests that group differences were generally 
larger in the subgroup with higher IQ. It is possible that because our comparison group was quite 
heterogeneous, this masked some of the differences between the groups.  The heterogeneity of our 
comparison group meant that we did not have the power to look at different subgroups within the 
lower IQ range, for example, those with different types of learning disability, but it is an interesting 
question for future research. It is also possible that the quality of the data was not as good for 
individuals with low IQ and this meant it was more difficult to detect group differences.  
Another interesting question for future research is whether there are any sex differences in 
the parameter differences found for the ASD group. Due to the small number of female participants 
we were not able to explore this question in the present study, but given increasing evidence that 
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the female phenotype in autism might differ from the male (e.g. Mandy et al., 2012), it is certainly an 
important factor to consider in the future.  
 Effects of collapsing over conditions on model parameters 
An important limitation of the current study was that there were relatively few trials per participant 
to use for model fitting. This meant that we had to collapse across experimental conditions in order 
to maximise data points, which was not ideal. Collapsing across conditions would not be expected to 
affect our treatment of the boundary separation and non-decision time parameters, as these are 
commonly fixed across conditions when trials are presented in an unpredictable order. It is 
traditionally assumed that the boundary is set before the trial begins and if the conditions are inter-
mixed (as ours mostly were) then the participant would not have an opportunity to adjust their 
boundary based on condition. There are alternative models that assume dynamic boundaries within 
a trial and across a block of trials, however, it is rare for these models to improve data fits and so it 
remains more common practice to assume a fixed boundary (Voskuilen, Ratcliff, & Smith, 2016).   
For drift rates, we would expect differences between easier and more difficult conditions. 
The differences in drift-rate we observed may well have been driven by a subset of conditions, which 
is an important limitation of the current study. Potentially, different drift rate fits for each condition 
could also have had consequences for how other parameters were fitted.  In addition to low trial 
numbers, our reasoning for collapsing across conditions was that we were particularly interested in 
any global and stable differences in processing. This would be predicted by certain neurocognitive 
theories of ASD, for example, the idea that autistic individuals have increased neural noise (Milne, 
2011; Simmons et al., 2007). Under these theories, a reduction in drift-rate should occur no matter 
what task or condition. In terms of the results of the current study, we can conclude that there were 
differences in drift-rate between the groups and that the model parameters were better at detecting 
these differences than the behavioural measures. Future research is required to explore whether 
drift-rate differences in ASD were observed are condition-specific or task-specific. This would be 
particularly informative if the manipulation of conditions was consistent across tasks (e.g. comparing 
social and non-social conditions in each task). 
Trial numbers for reliable estimation of cognitive measures 
One general limitation of fitting accumulator models is that the trial numbers required to obtain a 
reliable estimate of model parameters are not always feasible in clinical research.  Bayesian 
hierarchical fitting methods, like the HDDM, go some way in easing this problem (Wiecki et al., 
2013). It is important to note that low trial numbers are a general issue even if standard measures of 
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mean accuracy and RT are used. Research from our lab has shown that many more trial numbers are 
required to obtain reliable estimates of performance from classic forced-choice tasks than are often 
used in the literature (Hedge, Powell, & Sumner, 2018). For example, in the flanker task, which is a 
common measure of response inhibition, around 150 trials are required to obtain a stable flanker 
effect for each individual. However, even with 150 trials, the reliability of the flanker effect across 
sessions is low (intra-class correlation = 0.5). Thus, the conflicting findings in the ASD literature for 
forced-choice perceptual and cognitive tasks, which are commonly ascribed to the heterogeneity of 
the disorder and low sample sizes, could very well reflect unreliable measures and measurements. 
That is, if the same group of participants were tested a week later different results might be 
obtained and different conclusions drawn.  It remains to be seen whether DDM parameters could 
help to increase reliability when trial numbers are relatively low.  
Potential advantages of accumulator models for clinical research 
This is the first study apply the DDM to Autism research using social stimuli and we found that our 
interpretation of the results would have been quite different if we had only analysed the traditional 
behavioural measures.  We also found that model parameters were fairly consistent across 
individuals and tasks. Parameters derived from cognitive modelling may have an advantage over 
measures of RT and accuracy if they tap into more stable and reliable traits across individuals. 
Certainly in the ASD literature, where conflicting experimental findings are common, any measure 
with the potential to increase reliability and discriminability is worth pursuing.  Further, given that 
many task-related differences between autistic and non -autistic groups reduce with age (e.g. 
Happe, 1995), examining drift-rate could increase sensitivity to detect these differences later in 
development  It is iŵpoƌtaŶt to Ŷote that these ŵodels ĐaŶŶot add ͚eǆtƌa͛ ǀaƌiaŶĐe ;oƌ ͚sigŶal͛Ϳ that 
is not present in the original accuracy and RT data. What they can do is structure and organise this 
variance into more psychologically meaningful terms and provide a principled way to utilise data 
from across the whole RT distribution.   Isolating more psychologically meaningful factors from RT 
and accuracy data may help to identify key areas of difficulty across conditions and individuals. This 
in turn may lead to the development of more effective and individualised cognitive training 
paradigms, which at present mainly focus on measuring improvements in mean accuracy and RT 
(e.g. Powell, Wass, Erichsen, & Leekam, 2016).   
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Figure 1.  Schematic representation of the drift-diffusion model.  Information accumulates 
stochastically with drift-rate (v) until it reaches one of two response boundaries, at which point a 
response is triggered. The accuracy of the response is therefore determined by which bound was 
reached.  Boundary separation is represented by a. Bias in starting point towards either boundary is 
given by z.  Non-decision time (Ter), represents the time taken before and after the accumulation 
process to perceptually encode the stimulus and to generate a motor response. Reaction time is 
determined by the time taken to reach a bound plus non-decision time. Overall, higher drift-rates 
lead to fast and accurate responses, while lower drift rates result in slow and inaccurate responses. 
Large boundary separations lead to slow and accurate responses and small boundary separations 
result in fast but inaccurate responses.  
 
 
 Autistic group (n 
= 75) 
Not Autistic 
group (n = 46) 
Autistic subgroup 
IQ <85 (n= 51) 
Not Autistic 
subgroup IQ <85 
(n= 31) 
Age 15.5 ± 0.54 15.5 ± 1.3 15.5 ± 6.1  
(15.1 – 16.9) 
 
15.5 ± 7.2  
(14.1 – 16.8) 
Gender 67 male 45 male 45 male 30 male 
Full-scale IQ 
(WASI) 
85 ± 16.6 90 ± 18.9 89.7 ± 11.7 
(85-119) 
104 ± 9.2 
(85-119) 
a
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Table 1. Participant demographics and IQ; mean +/- standard deviation.  Statistics shown are means 
and standard deviations. WASI = Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence.  
 
 R scale fixed effects R scale random effects R scale covariates 
Bayesian ANOVA 0.5 1 0.354 
Bayesian Regression n/a n/a 0.354 
Bayesian Correlation n/a n/a 0.354 
Table 2. Default JASP priors used for analyses.  
 
 
Figure 2. Schematic representation of fitted model. The black node indicates the observed 
behavioural data (RT/Accuracy) for each group (g), participant (p) and trial (i). Above this are 
individual level nodes that represent parameter distributions for each participant (p).  We fitted 
three DDM parameters at this level:  drift-ƌate ͚ǀ͛, ďouŶdaƌǇ sepaƌatioŶ ͚a͛, and non-decision time 
;NDTͿ ͚T͛. Aďoǀe this aƌe the gƌoup leǀel Ŷodes foƌ the saŵe paƌaŵeteƌs, ƌepƌeseŶted ďǇ 
distƌiďutioŶs foƌ eaĐh gƌoup ;A“D, Ŷot A“DͿ that aƌe defiŶed ďǇ a ŵeaŶ μ aŶd staŶdaƌd deǀiatioŶ σ.   
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Figure 3. (A-B) Traditional behavioural measures. Proportion correct (accuracy) and RT for face 
recognition and gaze discrimination tasks for Autistic group (white bars) and not Autistic group 
(black bars), collapsed across conditions. No evidence for main effects or interactions were found 
(BFs all <3). (C-E) Estimated DDM parameters across the groups and tasks. Evidence for group 
differences were found for drift rate and boundary (see text) (F) Group classification. Receiver 
operating characteristics (ROC) curves for logistic classifier based on model parameters (black line) 
and traditional behavioural measures (grey lines), for autism classification. Blue line represents 
chance level performance. For A-E, error bars show standard error.  
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Figure 4.  (A-B) Traditional behavioural measures for participants with an IQ above 85. Proportion 
correct (accuracy) and RT for face recognition and gaze discrimination tasks for Autistic group (white 
bars) and not Autistic group (black bars), collapsed across conditions. No evidence for main effects 
or interactions were found (BFs all <3). (C-E) Estimated DDM parameters across the groups and 
tasks, for participants with an IQ above 85. Evidence for group differences were found for drift rate 
and boundary (see text) (F) Group classification for participants with an IQ above 85. Receiver 
operating characteristics (ROC) curves for logistic classifier based on model parameters (black line) 
and traditional behavioural measures (grey lines), for Autism classification. Blue line represents 
chance level performance. For A-E, error bars show standard error.  
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Figure 5. Model fits - posterior predicative distributions across tasks and groups. Positive values on 
the x-axis show correct RTs distributions, negative values show error RT distributions. Observed data 
from the tasks are shown in the black/white histograms, simulated data based on model fits are 
represented by blue lines.  
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Figure 6. Model fits for participants with IQ above 85. Posterior predictive distribution across tasks 
and groups. Positive values on the x-axis show correct RTs distributions, negative values show error 
RT distributions. Observed data from the tasks are shown in the black/white histograms, simulated 
data based on model fits are represented by blue lines. 
 
 Accuracy RT 10 RT 30 RT 50 RT 70 RT 90 RT error 
Autistic face 
recognition 
0.001 0.008 0.001 0.020 0.037 0.221 0.468 
Not Autistic 
face 
recognition 
0.002 0.007 0.013 0.015 0.038 0.288 0.798 
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Table 3.  Mean Square Errors (MSEs) between the observed data and the data simulated from the 
best fitting model parameters. Column 1 shows mean accuracy, columns 2-6 show correct RT 
quantiles, and column 7 shows median RT error.  
 
 Accuracy RT 10 RT 30 RT 50 RT 70 RT 90 RT error 
Autistic face 
recognition 
0.002 0.011 0.011 0.016 0.027 0.196 0.568 
Not Autistic 
face 
recognition 
0.002 0.006 0.010 0.012 0.037 0.334 1.081 
Autistic eye 
gaze  
0.004 0.004 0.012 0.019 0.054 0.459 0.086 
Not Autistic 
eye gaze 
0.003 
 
0.006 
 
0.021 
 
0.015 
 
0.024 
 
0.392 
 
0.148 
 
 
Table 4.  Mean Square Errors (MSEs) between the observed data and the data simulated from the 
best fitting model parameters, for participants with IQ above 85. Column 1 shows mean accuracy, 
columns 2-6 show correct RT quantiles, and column 7 shows median RT error. 
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Figure 6. Relationship between hyperactivity-inattention (ADHD symptoms) and drift-rate and full-
scale IQ and drift-rate, split by task and group. There was no relationship between hyperactivity-
inattention and drift rate in autistic participants (A-B). Whereas, there was a strong negative 
relationship between hyperactivity-inattention and drift-rate in non-autistic participants (C-D). There 
was no relationship between drift-rate and IQ in autistic participants (E-F), but a strong relationship 
between drift-rate and IQ in non-autistic participants (G-H).  
Figure 7. Cross task correlations between estimated DDM parameters. Boundary separation (A) and 
drift-rate (B) correlated positively across tasks. There was no evidence that non-decision times (C) 
correlated across tasks. 
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